The cyber-weapons paradox: 'They're not that dangerous'
A war boffin talks to El Reg
What we should worry about
Speaking to The Reg earlier this week, Rid said that the systems we really should be worried about are industrial control systems – SCADA – computer systems that control the national grid, public transport, chemical mixing in factories andprison doors. These are the systems that he claims have poor security set-ups:
"We don't see enough pressure on control systems vendors and creators, security in these areas is often shocking and I don't know how they've got away with it for so long," the war boffin complained.
Control systems software is deeply specialised, and often even the people running it don't understand it:
Rid said: "These types of software are so specialised that people running the software have to go back to the manufacturer when there's a problem, because their own help desks can't help."
Threat attacks could almost only come from insiders, because systems like this are so specific.
Rid's top tip is that it's the people who work on esoteric software – maverick insiders – that we should worry about rather than patriotic foreign hack-warriors.
One of the computer hacks with the greatest physical impact ever came from an angry Australian sewage worker who used his knowledge of pumping systems to pay back an employment grudge. Rid recounts the case:
One of the most damaging breaches of a SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquistion) system happened in March and April 2000 in Maroochy Shire, in Queensland in Australia. After 46 repeated wireless intrusions into a large wastewater over a period of three months, a lone attacker succeeded in spilling more than a million litres of raw sewage into local parks, rivers and even the grounds of a Hyatt Regency hotel. The author of the attack was 49-year-old Vitek Boden. His motive was revenge; the Maroochy Shire Council had rejected his job application. At the time Boden was an employee of the company that had installed the Maroochy plant's SCADA system.
Boden's inside knowledge and the software he had on his laptop allowed him to take control of 150 sewage pumping stations in the area. Otherwise pulling off such a physically significant and gungy attack would require such a detailed knowledge of a particular system and its weaknesses that very few people would be capable of it.
What the government should do
Though the threat may be lower than media hype suggests, the government needs to know more, and there needs to be more open debate on the risks of cyber weapons, Rid said. "We need more expertise in these areas in both government and in public," added the war boffin.
He said that government needs to understand industrial control systems.
In short, Rid suggests ditching the spooks: "If we put GCHQ in charge of cyber security, by their clearly secretive nature, they won't be able to put public pressure on businesses to make necessary reforms and improvements to their products. That's not where public pressure comes from.
Then he suggests getting in some hackers: "Why not have a team of white-hat hackers – people who publicly expose weaknesses and make them public if they are not fixed."
And then, he adds, the debate needs to be clarified a bit – so that the focus is on the real threats: "If we look at the world of brick-and-mortar weapons, we wouldn't call a bag a weapon though it could be used to carry away stolen goods. But in cyber space we lose our common sense and call everything a weapon. We need to inform the public debate." ®
Cyber Weapons by Thomas Rid and Peter McBurney is published today in RUSI Journal
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