Acknowledging the end of joined up records?

While I have a lot of sympathy for the hospital trusts which have already installed Millennium, what has happened to the strategic aspects?

After all, the aim of the NPfIT was to provide interoperable single records - or at any rate, Detailed Care Records - defined as single records used by all the organisations providing care in a locality, and enabling communication of records between general practice, community and Trusts to prevent duplication and increase patient safety.

The ability to share information locally - with explicit patient consent - is needed to support new ways of working, and Liverpool is an example of this - completely outside either CfH or the LSP, CSC: it uses EMIS Web and is driven and developed by local needs and initiatives.

The objectives of sharing appropriate parts of records with explicit patient consent can be put into practice without single shared records or even Detailed Care Records.

The Lorenzo Regional Care concept - where all organisations use Lorenzo as their record of prime entry - doesn't seem to have been adopted in London or Southern, so it looks as though it is only in NME that you run the risk of having your records in a single shared record - currently TPP SystmOne and soon, if CSC is to be believed, Lorenzo - with all the problems that introduces such as data quality (very important: known case of podiatrist entering diabetes - and no-one else able to remove it even though demonstrably false) and medication management, let alone confidentiality for the patient.

Now if you have Lorenzo - not planned to interoperate with anyone else or TPP - with a reputation of lack of interest in any form of interoperability - in NME, Millennium which does not, AFAIAA, have facilities or plans for interoperability with any primary care records - in London and 8 Trusts in Southern, where does that leave the grand strategy?

Oh joy

Given the total balls-up they've made of the patient appointment systems in Barnet & Chase Farm Hospital and Barnet PCT, I think I'll buy shares in BUPA.

Can BT be trusted?

But can we trust BT with this sensitive personal information?

They have a record of covert activity as an ISP, misleading customers and press, and engaging unauthorised interception of private internet communications. They are currently under investigation by CPS for alleged offences under RIPA, DPA, PECR, and MCA. The ICO has indicated that ther 2006 and 2007 trials of Phorm's Webwise/PageSense technology without customr consent were "in probable breach" of DPA.

They also do not have a very good record in terms of competence, given the leaks from their customer forums over the last twelve months, and their inability to manage secure cookies with customer online billing accounts.

And we are trusting these guys with sensitive health data, at the same time as they are planning to intercept the internet traffic of their broadband customers?

I would refer you to the customer forum pages where all this was discussed but nice trustworthy BT removed it all from public view in line with their declared policy of transparency - "you can see right through them".

Why not just save time, and invite some Chinese or Russian hackers directly to take the contract?