Card-sniffing trojans target Diebold ATM software
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Security researchers from Sophos have discovered sophisticated malware that siphons payment card information out of automatic teller machines made by Diebold and possibly other manufacturers.
Sophos researcher Vanja Svajcer found three samples after combing through VirusTotal and a similar online database earlier this month. If installed, all three trojans contained functions that allowed them to log information recorded by an ATM's magnetic card reader.
They also appeared to include routines for encrypting the stolen data and instructions for retrieving the captured passwords using the ATM's printing capabilities. That would allow mules outfitted with the proper codes to fetch the pilfered information from the targeted machines, Svajcer told The Register.
Diebold became aware of the trojans in January, after an incident "isolated in Russia" attempted to use the malware to intercept sensitive information, according to an advisory the company sent its customers. Suspects in the incident have been apprehended, and Diebold is working with authorities "to assist with the investigation into these recent crimes," the advisory added.
Diebold has also offered a software update as a precautionary measure.
The Sophos researcher said this appears to be the first time malware has been uncovered that specifically targets banking ATMs. That said, it's not unusual for cybercriminals to steal payment card information by tampering with point-of-sale terminals. In October, for example, organized crime syndicates managed to doctor hundreds of card swipers used by UK-based retail outlets. The attack resulted in the estimated loss of tens of millions of pounds.
The trojans uncovered by Svajcer target Diebold software known as Agilis 91x, which can manage large fleets of ATMs made by Diebold and other manufacturers. Little is known about the malware's authors. Functionality that converts currency between US dollars, Russian roubles, and Ukrainian grivna leads him to believe they have ties to Eastern Europe.
Both Svajcer and Zacheroff stressed the trojan could only be installed by someone who had physical access to an ATM, since the devices, obviously, don't have floppy drives and typically run only on private isolated networks. That means the malware could most likely be installed only with help of an insider or in the event passwords weren't managed properly.
More from Svajcer is available here. ®
COMMENTS
More Info Would be Nice
I'm curious about the operating system (s) used for these ATMs and what privileges the typical technicians have on them. With such relatively static configurations, it would seem quite straightforward to lock these machines down and perform regular audits to counter these risks, even if the techs have admin rights.
Eirik Iverson
http://www.blueridgenetworks.com/products/edgeguard.htm
@ Oliver Mayes
I could be naive, as well, but my suspicion is that the ATMs in question are the privately owned NoNameCashSpot™ machines often found at gas stations and convenience stores, rather than bank-owned machines. (G**gle "own an ATM" and see how many companies are willing to sell one to any Tom, Dick, or Vladiszlav with cash in hand...) Someone comes in every so often to put cash in and unload the records (electronic or paper), and the store owners don't pay any attention 'cause it's not their machine.
Buy one, install the sniffer software and put it out someplace, upgrade the software whenever you go in to service it, and no one gives a rodent's rectum 'cause "it's just the guy servicing his machine."
It's why I try to avoid using those particular machines if at all possible.
apparently...
all your money/accounts are belong to us.
your friendly local haX0rs

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