Of laptops and US border searches
Feds seek unfettered access
Agentless Backup is Not a Myth
Recently, I was going through an airport with my shoes, coat, jacket, and belt off as well as with my carry-on bag, briefcase, and laptop all separated for easy inspection. I was heading through security at the Washington D.C., Ronald Reagan National Airport in Arlington, Virginia, or "National" as we locals call it. As I passed through the new magnetometer which gently puffed air all over my body - which to me seems to be a cross between a glaucoma test and Marilyn Monroe in Gentlemen Prefer Blondes - a TSA employee absent-mindedly asked if he could "inspect" my laptop computer. While the inspection was cursory, the situation immediately gave me pause: What was in my laptop anyway?
Similar thoughts must have gone through the head of Michael Timothy Arnold on July 17, 2005. He was having a bad day that was about to get much worse.
Arnold arrived at the International Arrivals Building at Los Angeles International Airport after a 20-hour flight from the Philippines. He might have looked like any other US traveler arriving from Manila after what he said was a three-week vacation visiting friends--tired, haggard, and casual. The Customs and Border Patrol agents were a bit suspicious, because they knew the Philippines is a haven for "sex tourism." They were also suspicious because Arnold could not remember the name of the company where he had once worked as a night auditor and appeared "fidgety." They demanded that Arnold power up his laptop, which the agents then examined for child pornography - which they ultimately found.
The Federal District Court rejected the government's argument that a search of a laptop is no different than rifling through luggage during arrivals inspection, and they suppressed the warrantless and essentially "suspicious-less" laptop search as unreasonable. The case was argued before the federal appellate court in October 2007 and a decision is imminent. The salient question: To what extent may customs, border, immigration, or other government officials search, mirror, copy, or analyze the contents of electronic gadgets with neither probable cause nor a warrant?
At the edge of law
It is clear that people traveling into and out of a country have a lower expectation of privacy at the border. Perhaps more accurately, a governmental search at the border is more likely to be considered "reasonable."
The agents get to do things they can't do if, for example, they simply stop you on the street. They can question you, they can rifle through your unmentionables, and even examine documents you are bringing with you. The agents can even disassemble your gas tank, looking for hidden compartments that you could be using to smuggle things. In the Arnold case, the government argued that its search authority at the border is "plenary" or unrestricted, except that to do an invasive body cavity search, it would have to have some kind of suspicion.
But searches of things? Well, they can do whatever they want it would seem.
The customs agents' job is to protect the nation from "anything harmful," to gather intelligence, prevent terrorism, and to enforce all of the laws, including child pornography and copyright laws. The computer is no different from any other "closed container" that the agent may search. Just as the agent needs no probable cause to search your underwear, they need no probable cause to rummage through your laptop. And besides, they are doing it to protect the country and enforce the laws and prevent terrorist attacks. You don't have any privacy rights at the border anyway, so what's the problem?
Same planet, different worlds
So, for example, is a computer the same as a briefcase or suitcase, under the law? I mean, if you don't want your stuff searched, don't bring it with you. You abandon your "expectation of privacy" at the border, right?
The government's position is as frightening as it is naíve. A computer is not the same thing as a briefcase. Nor, for that matter, is an iPod, a thumb drive, or a cell phone. It is both quantitatively and qualitatively different, and that makes all of the difference in this case. It seems that the government and the lower court are speaking past, and not at, each other. The government says, "We can do anything for any reason," and the court says, "No, you need reasonable suspicion to search a laptop."
Indeed, they are both wrong.
COMMENTS
in short
Anon rodent says: "Terrorists win, again"—if you still believe this is all about terrorism.
While you focus primarily on personal privacy issues, what about business? You might be returning from a field-research trip, some conference, contract negotiations or whatever, your computer might be filled to the brim with critical business or even NDA-material, or maybe your latest novel or critical analysis of modern-day fashism that makes government X look bad. Now would you please hand that over, decrypted, for reasons of national security, to be copied, analyzed, stored?
Invasive searches like the ones described lead to people no longer carrying any data of any value whatsoever, thereby curbing travellers' work efficiency -> "Terrorists win". So if you bother to take along a computer at all, you will have all data on some secure remote sever, and you will rather not put the server data (and no encryption, no hidden partitions, no nothing) on the machine but in your head. If you believe in secure remote severs that is. Now if that machine got inspected, you would be suspicious as hell, and you know what happens to suspicious people who will not admit. They get special treatments, sometimes even a free vacation in an interesting place. Like Syria. So you might better fill your machine with some random "identity" bull in order to make it look "pure". Thereby, being denied privacy essentially promotes a culture of lies and deception. I am not even touching on the inherently connected issues of classism and racism that determine who is searched and who is not.
at zacn
read the caess i listed far earlier. if consent is requested you can say no, they can only search (other than as prescribed in Terry) if they make an arrest or have a warrant or there is immediate articulable danger (clear and present). in a Terry Stop they may detain only in place, you are not compelled, nor can you be punished, to answer. they may "frisk" only your outer clothing (no bags) ad they may only remove in that "feeling" frisk a weapon that would put them or the public in jeopardy, e.g. a gun.
anything more requires arrest or warrant. they courts (higher courts) will NOT look favorably on BS stops and arrests.
i know, i've been there (court).
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Florida_v._Royer
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terry_v._Ohio
and most of all...
http://supreme.justia.com/us/461/352/case.htm
also see: http://edwardlawson.com/

IT infrastructure monitoring strategies
Requirements Checklist for Choosing a Cloud Backup and Recovery Service Provider
Cloud based data management
Enabling efficient data center monitoring
Agentless Backup is Not a Myth